In this paper, we deal with the problem of maximizing the profit of Network Operators (NOs) of green cellular networks in situations where Quality-of-Service (QoS) guarantees must be ensured to users, and Base Stations (BSs) can be shared among different operators.
Introduction
The increasing consumption of electrical energy is one of the most important issues characterizing modern society because of its effects on climate changes and on the depletion the same coalition. We achieve our goal by devising a hedonic shift algorithm to form stable coalitions that allows each NO to autonomously and selfishly decide whether to leave the current coalition to join a different one or not on the basis of the net profit it receives for doing so.
In our approach, each NO pays for the energy consumed to serve each user, whether it belongs to it or to another NO, but receives a payoff (computed as discussed later) for doing so. We prove that the proposed algorithm converges to a Nash-stable set of disjoint coalitions [12] , whereby no NO can benefit to leave the current coalition to join a different one.
Our solution adopts an asynchronous approach in which each NO autonomously makes its own decisions, and where the best solution arises without the need to synchronize them or to resort to a trusted third party. As a consequence, the solution we propose can be readily implemented in a distributed fashion.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the algorithm we propose, we carry out a thorough experimental evaluation considering real-world traffic traces, and a set of realistic scenarios. The results we obtain indicate that our algorithm allows indeed a population of NOs to significantly improve their profits thanks to the combination of energy reduction and satisfaction of QoS requirements.
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• we consider the problem of maximizing operators' profit in green cellular networks;
• we model the problem as a cooperative game with transferable utility;
• we devise a distributed algorithm enabling operators to find the coalition maximizing their profits under stability concerns;
• we show its effectiveness through experimental analysis in realistic scenarios;
• we assess the impact of energy price and user population on the profits attained by operators.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the system under study and we present the problem addressed in this paper. In Section 3, we present the cooperative game-theoretic framework we use to study the problem of coalition formation and the hedonic shift algorithm we design to form stable coalitions. In Section 4, we show results from an experimental evaluation to show the effectiveness of the proposed approach. In Section 5, we provide an overview of related works. Finally, in Section 6, we conclude the paper and present an outlook on possible future extensions.
System Model and Problem Definition

System Model
We consider an area served by a set N = {1, . . . , N} of NOs, whose BSs fully cover that area and whose coverage overlaps (as typically happens in urban areas [9, 13, 14] ). To keep 3 the notation simple, we assume that in the area of interest there is only one BS per NO, so in the rest of this paper, we will use the terms BS and NO interchangeably (the extension of the model to support multiple BSs per NO is straightforward). Each BS i is characterized by its maximum downlink transmission capacity C i , and by its power consumption W i (n i ) that, as argued in [7, 15, 16] , is linearly dependent on the number of users it is serving, that is:
where α i (the static term) is the load-independent power consumption (which is usually known from the specifications of the BS, and typically accounts for about 90% of the total consumption [4, 7] ), and β i n i (the dynamic term) is the load-dependent power consumption (that can be determined by linear regression from real power measurements [16] ). Each NO i provides network connectivity to a set U i of customers (hereafter also referred to as users). Each user j ∈ U i is characterized by its required QoS, quantified by the minimum downlink data rate D j it requests, and the actual downlink data rate d j it gets from the network.
Each user j ∈ U (where U = N i=1 U i ) can connect to any BS in the system regardless of the NO who owns the BS (i.e., it can connect to a BS that belongs to the NO to which it is subscribed or it can roam on the BS of another one). This can be accomplished by using techniques like cell wilting and blossoming [17] . However, the aggregate allocated data rate to users connected to BS i cannot exceed its capacity C i , that is:
We assume that the number of users receiving service from a BS i varies over time, and is described by the load profile curve ℓ i (t) of that BS that expresses, as function of time, the percentage of the maximum number of users M i that can receive service by BS i when each user j is allocated its entire desired data rate D j . It then follows that, if all the users have the same data rate requirement (i.e., D j = D for all j ∈ U i ), then M i = C i /D. Conversely, if users are heterogeneous, then M j is estimated as M j = C i /D, whereD is the weighted average of the data rates requested by users, i.e.,D = j∈U i p j D j , where p j is the probability that user j arrives at BS i.
An example of a typical daily load profile is depicted in Figure 1 , where the x-axis represents the time (in hours) and the y-axis is the normalized load of the BS [18] . For instance, if at a given time t, M i = 10 and ℓ i (t) = 0.8, the number n i (t) of user of BS i at time t is n i (t) = 0.8 · 10 = 8.
Problem Definition
Given the system characterized as above and a particular area of interest, each NO seeks to maximize its net profit (i.e., the difference between its revenues and costs) in the presence of a time-varying population of users in this area. The net profit rate P i of NO i (i.e., the profit it makes per unit of time) can be expressed as
where R i,j is the revenue rate generated by user j on BS i, E i is the electricity cost rate of BS i, and L i,j (d i ) is the penalty rate incurred by NO i if user j receives a downlink rate d j lower than its QoS value D j , which is given by the following loss function:
Thus, L i,j (d i ) is zero if the QoS of the user is completely satisfied (i.e., d j = D j ), and linearly increases until R i,j as the assigned data rate d j decreases (so that an NO gets no revenue from those customers that receive no service). If the NOs in the area of interest cooperate among them (i.e., they share their users and BSs) then each NO i can maximize the corresponding value of P i by acting on the various terms of Eq. (3) as follows:
• it can attempt to reduce W i (n i ) by offloading (some of) its users to the BSs of other operators so that its BS can be switched off entirely (by exploiting sleep modes [8] ) or only in part (by relying on cell zooming [9] );
• it can attempt to increase R i,j either by attracting users from other NOs, so that it can better amortize its energy cost W i (n i ), or by relying on BSs of other NOs to accept users that, if working alone, it could not serve without violating Eq. (2), thus incurring into a (possibly high) penalty rate L i,j .
It is evident that, to exploit these opportunities, each NO must be willing to cooperate with (at least some of) the other ones. In the following section, we will characterize the conditions under which such a cooperation is not only possible, but also sought by these NOs. 5
The Coalition Formation Game
As discussed before, cooperation is the key to increase profit. However, it is unreasonable to assume that a NO is willing to unconditionally cooperate with the other ones regardless of the benefits it receives. As a matter of fact, the acceptance of users roaming from other NOs is beneficial only if the additional revenue they bring outweighs the costs and the possible penalties they induce. Furthermore, the offloading of users to other NOs makes sense only if a suitable revenue results from this operation for the off-loader.
To cooperate, a set of NOs must first form a coalition, i.e., they all must agree to share their own BSs and users among them. Given a set of NOs, however, there can be many different coalitions that can be formed, each one differing from the other ones in terms of the structure (i.e., the identity of each member) and/or of the profit it brings to their members.
In order to join a coalition, a NO must indeed find it profitable, i.e., it must be sure that the profit it earns by joining the coalition is no worse of the one it obtains by working alone. Furthermore, in order to be sure that this profit is not ephemeral, a NO must seek other properties that guarantee the suitability of a coalition, namely:
• Stability: a coalition is stable if none of its participants finds that it is more profitable to leave it (e.g., to stay alone or to join another coalition) rather than cooperating with the other ones. Lack of stability causes possible monetary losses for the following reasons:
a NO that has joined a coalition with the expectation of receiving users roaming from other NOs is penalized if, after switching on a BS on which to accommodate these users, these NOs leave the coalition;
a NO that has accepted more users than those it can serve without incurring into a penalty, expecting to use the BSs of other NOs to accommodate them, is penalized if these NOs leave the coalition.
• Fairness: when joining a coalition, a NO expects that the resulting profits are fairly divided among participants. As an unfair division leads to instability, a fair profit allocation strategy is mandatory.
From these considerations, it clearly follows that a way must be provided to each NO to decide whether to participate to a coalition or not and, if so, which one among all the possible coalitions is worth joining. In this paper, we address this issue by modeling the problem of coalition formation as a coalition formation cooperative game with transferable utility [10, 19] , where each NO cooperates with the other ones in order to maximize its net profit rate, and by devising an algorithm to solve it. By using our algorithm, the various NOs can make their decisions concerning coalition membership.
In the rest of this section, we first set the coalition formation problem in the gametheoretic framework (Section 3.1), then we present an algorithm to form stable coalitions among NOs (Section 3.2), and finally we present an optimization model to allocate users 6 to a set of BSs, in order to reduce costs and, at the same time, to meet user QoS for NOs inside the same coalition (Section 3.3).
Characterization
Our coalition formation algorithm is based on a hedonic game [11] , a class of coalition formation cooperative games [10, 19] where each NO acts as a selfish agent and where its preferences over coalitions depend only on the composition of that coalition. That is, NOs prefer being in one coalition rather than in another one solely based on who else is in the coalitions they belong.
Formally, given the set N = {1, 2, . . . , N} of NOs (henceforth also referred to as the players), a coalition S ⊆ N represents an agreement among the NOs in S to act as a single entity.
At any given time, the set of players is partitioned into a coalition partition Π, that we define as the set Π = {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S l }, where S k ⊆ N (k = 1, . . . , l) is a disjoint coalition such that l k=1 S k = N and S j ∩ S k = ∅ for j = k. Given a coalition partition Π, for any NO i ∈ N , we denote as S Π (i) the coalition to which i is participating.
Each coalition S is associated with its coalition value v(S), that we define as the net profit rate of that coalition, that is:
where:
• R U S is the coalition revenue rate, corresponding to the sum of revenue rates of individual users j ∈ U S (where U S = i∈S U i is the joint user population of the NOs belonging to S);
• Q U S is the coalition load cost rate, and is computed by minimizing the costs resulting from serving the users in U S using all the resources provided by the NOs belonging to S (we discuss this in Section 3.3);
• K(S) is the coalition formation cost rate, that takes into account the cost incurred by players to establish and maintain the coalition (e.g., the costs for system reconfiguration to enable user migration and handover across NOs). In this paper, we assume K(S) to be proportional to the coalition size, and we define it as:
where K i is the coalition formation cost rate for NO i.
Obviously, each NO i ∈ S must receive a fraction x i (S) of the coalition value, that we call the payoff of i in S. Our game is conceived in such a way to form coalitions in which NOs get payoffs as high as possible, without violating the fairness requirement, so that stability is achieved. Thus, a payoff allocation rule must be specified in order to compute the payoffs of each coalition member in such a way to ensure fairness in the division of payoffs.
To this end, we use the Shapley value [20] , a payoff allocation rule that is based on the concept of marginal contribution of players (i.e., the change in the worth of a coalition when a player joins to that coalition), such that the larger is the contribution provided by a player to a coalition, the higher is the payoff allocated to it. 1 This means that, in a given coalition, some "more-contributing" NOs will be rewarded by other "less-contributing" NOs to encourage them to join the coalition. More specifically, the Shapley value φ i (v) of player i is defined as:
where the sum is over all subsets S not containing i (the symbol "\" denotes the set difference operator), and the symbol "!" denotes the factorial function.
It is worth noting that we rely on the Shapley value for its interesting properties. Nevertheless, other payoff allocation rules can be used and our work is general enough to support them.
To set up the coalition formation process, we need to define, for each NO i, a preference relation i that NO i can use to order and compare all the possible coalitions it may join. Formally, this corresponds to define a complete, reflexive, and transitive binary relation over the set of all coalitions that NO i can form (see [12] ).
Specifically, for any NO i ∈ N and given S 1 , S 2 ⊆ N , the notation S 1 i S 2 means that NO i prefers being a member of S 1 over S 2 or at least i prefers both coalitions equally. In our coalition formation game, for any NO i ∈ N , we use the following preference relation:
where S 1 , S 2 ⊆ N are any two coalitions that contain NO i (i.e., i ∈ S 1 and i ∈ S 2 ), and u i is a preference function defined for any NO i as follows:
where x i (S) is the payoff received by NO i in S by means of Eq. (7), and h(i) is a history set where NO i stores the identity of the coalitions that have been already evaluated so that we avoid generating twice the same candidate coalition (a similar idea for pruning already considered coalitions has also been used in previously published work, such as in [22] ). Thus, according to Eq. (9), each NO prefers to join the coalition that provides the larger payoff.
The strict counterpart of i , denoted by ≻ i , is defined by replacing ≥ with > in Eq. (8), and implies that i strictly prefers being a member of S 1 over S 2 .
The Algorithm for Coalition Formation
In this section, we present an algorithm for coalition formation that allows the NOs to take distributed decisions for selecting which coalitions to join at any point in time. This algorithm is based on the following hedonic shift rule (see [22] ):
Definition 1. Given a coalition partition Π = {S 1 , . . . , S h } on the set N and a preference relation ≻ i , any NO i ∈ N decides to leave its current coalition S Π (i) = S l , for 1 ≤ l ≤ h, to join another one S k ∈ Π ∪ ∅, with S k = S l , if and only if S k ∪ {i} ≻ i S l , that is if its payoff in the new coalition exceeds the one it is getting in its current coalition. Hence,
This shift rule (that we denote as "→") provides a mechanism through which any NO can leave its current coalition S Π (i) and join another coalition S k , given that the new coalition S k ∪ {i} is strictly preferred over S Π (i) through any preference relation that the NOs are using. This rule can be seen as a selfish decision made by a NO to move from its current coalition to a new one, regardless of the effects of this move on the other NOs.
Using the hedonic shift rule, we design a distributed hedonic coalition formation algorithm for NOs as presented in Algorithm 1.
The basic idea of the algorithm is to have each NO i search, asynchronously with respect to the other NOs, the state space of possible coalitions it may join, and for each one of them, evaluate whether it is preferable (according to the corresponding ≻ i relation) to remain in its current coalition, or to join it. Whenever a NO decides to move from a coalition to another one, it updates its history set h(i) by appending the coalition it is leaving, so that the same coalition is not visited twice during the coalition space search. A NO iterates the actions listed in Algorithm 1 until no more hedonic shift rules are possible. It is worth noting that the asynchronicity of our algorithm makes it suitable to be executed, for instance, when new users arrive to NOs, thus making it able to adapt to environmental changes.
Let us explain in detail how Algorithm 1 works. The algorithm takes as parameters the global state state, storing the current shared coalition partition Π c , and the identity i of the calling NO (initially there are no coalitions, i.e., Π c = Π 0 = {1}, {2}, . . . , {N} ).
At each execution of the algorithm, NO i initializes its history set h and other auxiliary variables (lines 2-3), and then enters a loop that is executed until no more hedonic shift rules can be performed from the last coalition partition considered by i.
In each loop iteration, NO i retrieves the current coalition partition, and generates all the possible hedonic shifts until no more of them are possible. Given the distributed nature of the algorithm, we postulate the use of suitable distributed space management algorithms (e.g. [23, 24] ).
Then, after acquiring a lock to gain exclusive access to the shared state (line 5) in order to ensure its atomic update (by means of a suitable distributed mutual exclusion algorithm [23] ), NO i iteratively evaluates all the possible coalitions it can form from its current coalition partition, to look for the one with the higher payoff.
To do so, given its current coalition partition Π c , for each coalition S k ∈ Π c ∪ ∅ (not present in its history set and different from its current one S Πc (i)), NO i applies the hedonic shift rule and evaluates its preference against the current coalition S Πc (i) (lines 9-16). 9 (5) and Eq. (7) 12: Unlock(state) 25: until S best = S cur 26: end procedure If a coalition S k with the higher payoff is found (lines 17-23), NO i adds to its history set h the coalition S Πc (i) \ {i} it is leaving, and updates the partition set by updating both S k (that now contains also i) and S Πc (i) (that now does not contain i anymore).
Then, after releasing the exclusive lock to the shared state (line 24), NO i repeats the above steps (lines 5-24) to look for a better coalition, in case some other NO has meanwhile modified the shared state by changing the coalition partition.
Eventually, if no other better coalition is found, NO i terminates the execution of the algorithm (line 25), until a new instance is run again.
The convergence of the proposed algorithm during the hedonic coalition formation phase is guaranteed as follows:
Proposition 1 (Convergence). Starting from any initial coalition structure Π 0 , the proposed algorithm always converges to a final partition Π f .
Proof. The coalition formation phase can be mapped to a sequence of shift operations. That is, according to the hedonic shift rule, every shift operation transforms the current partition Π c into another partition Π c+1 . Thus, starting from the initial step, the algorithm yields the following transformations:
where the symbol "→" denotes the application of a shift operation. Every application of the shift rule leads to a coalition partition that has not been previously visited (i.e., a new coalition partition). Thus, the number of transformations performed by the shift rule is finite (at most, it is equal to the number of partitions, that is the Bell number) and hence the sequence in Eq. (10) will always terminate and converge to a final partition Π f .
The stability of the final partition Π f resulting from the convergence of the proposed algorithm can be addressed by using the following stability definition (see [12] for details).
It is worth noting that Nash-stability captures the notion of stability with respect to movements of single NOs (i.e., no NO has an incentive to unilaterally deviate).
For the hedonic coalition formation phase of the proposed algorithm, we can prove the following result:
Proposition 2 (Nash-stability). Any final partition Π f resulting from Algorithm 1 is Nashstable.
Proof. We prove it by contradiction. Assume that the final partition Π f is not Nash-stable. Consequently, there exists a NO i ∈ N and a coalition S k ∈ Π f ∪ ∅ such that S k ∪ {i} ≻ i S Π f (i). Then, NO i will perform a hedonic shift operation and hence Π f → Π ′ f , where Π ′ f is the new coalition partition resulting after the hedonic shift operation. This contradicts the assumption that Π f is the final outcome of our algorithm.
It is worth to point out that Nash-stability also implies the so called individual-stability [12] . A partition Π = {S 1 , . . . , S l } is individually-stable if it does not exist a NO i ∈ N and a coalition S k ∈ Π ∪ ∅ such that S k ∪ {i} ≻ i S Π (i) and S k ∪ {i} j S k for all j ∈ S k , i.e., if no NO can benefit by moving from its coalition to another existing (possibly empty) coalition while not making the members of that coalition worse of. Thus, we can conclude that our algorithm always converges to a partition Π f which is both Nash-stable and individually stable.
Given the NP-completeness of the problem of finding a Nash-stable partition [25] , the computational cost of our algorithm can become quite large when the number of NOs increases (indeed, in the worst case, it is bounded by the N th Bell number, where N is the number of NOs). In these cases, we can reduce the computational cost by having each NO check for the Nash-stability of its current coalition partition (this check takes polynomial time [25] ), and execute the algorithm only if Nash-stability no longer holds true.
Computation of the Optimal Coalition Load Cost
The algorithm presented in the previous section requires the computation of the value v(S) of any coalition S that each NO i may possibly join, that in turn requires the computations of coalition load cost rate Q(U S ) (see Eq. (5)). To compute Q(U S ), we need in turn to determine, for the coalition S, the optimal data rate allocation (i.e., the allocation of users that minimizes the costs of NOs).
To this end, we define a Mixed Integer Linear Program (MILP) modeling the problem of allocating a set U S of users onto a set S of BSs so that the overall cost rates of NOs in S are minimized. The resulting optimization model is shown in Figure 2 , where we use the same notation introduced in Section 2 (however, to ease readability, we denote with U the user set, i.e., we drop the dependence from S).
In the optimization model we use the following decision variables:
• u i,j , which is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if user j is allocated to BS i;
• d i,j , which is a real variable representing the downlink data rate allocated to user j by BS i;
• b i , which is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if BS i is switched on.
The objective function Q U (see Eq. (11a)) represents the cost rates incurred by the coalition of NOs for serving users in U, and is defined as the sum of the costs due to the power absorbed by the BSs that are switched-on, and of those due to QoS violations (if any). The resulting optimal user allocation is bound to the following constraints:
• Eq. (11b) ensures that the capacity of a switched-on BS is not exceeded;
• Eq. (11c) imposes that each user is served by exactly one BS;
• Eq. (11d) states that only BSs that are switched on can serve users; the purpose of this constraint is to avoid that a user is served by a BS that will be switched off; As can be noted from the definition of Q U , the solution of the optimization problem at a specif instant of time requires the knowledge of the number of users present in each BS i at that time. In general, however, such number is not constant, but it varies over time according to the corresponding load profile ℓ i (t).
In order to compute the number of users of BS i at time t from ℓ i , we proceed as follows: first, as typically done in the literature [26, 27] , we discretize ℓ i (t) by splitting the time axis into uniform disjoint sub-intervals [τ, τ + ∆t) of length ∆t time units (where ∆t is the discretization step). Then, we approximate the (normalized) load of each subinterval as a constant value set to the peak load of that subinterval. For instance, the result of the discretization of the load profile of Figure 1 with ∆t of 1 hour is depicted in Figure 3 . In this figure, the time-horizon of one day (i.e., 24 hours) is split into several subintervals [τ, τ + ∆t) of length ∆t = 1 hour, where τ = 0, 1, . . . , 23. Each subinterval is delimited by vertical dotted segments, while every horizontal solid red segment is the peak inside each subinterval, that we will use as an approximation of the (normalized) load inside the subinterval. 
Experimental Evaluation
In order to assess the ability of our algorithm of increasing the net profits for a population of NOs, we perform a set of experiments in which we consider a variety of realistic scenarios and real-world traffic data. In these experiments we vary, in a controlled way, various input parameters of the algorithm, namely the cost of energy, the QoS requirements of users, and the discretization step of the traffic profile curve, so that we are able to assess the impact of each one of them on the performance of the algorithm. The results we collect, discussed in this section, demonstrate the ability of our algorithm of yielding significant increases of the net profit achieved by a set of NOs in all the scenarios we consider.
To perform such experiments, we develop an ad-hoc simulator written in C++ and interfaced with CPLEX [28] to solve the various instances of the optimization model presented in Section 3.3.
Experimental Setup
We consider a system configuration comprising five NOs, each one owning a single BS. Without loss of generality, we assume that all the BSs are identical in terms of capacity and energy consumption. More specifically, we set C i = 100 Mbps, α i = 0.551 kW, and β i = 0.00146 kW for i = {1, . . . , 5} (these last two values have been taken from [16] ). We also assume that all NOs incur in the same coalition cost rate, i.e., K i = 0.01 $/hour ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , 5}.
Furthermore, we assume that each BS has its own load profile, that differs from those of the other ones. The load profiles we consider in our experiments, reported in Figs. 4a-4e, have been obtained from real-world data [29] consisting of normalized cellular traffic collected, with a resolution of 30 minutes, in a metropolitan urban area during one week, and been already used in similar studies [13, 30] . Specifically, each load profile curve ℓ i (·) of Figure 4 has been obtained by fitting a periodic cubic spline to the traffic data related to BS i. We characterize each load profile by computing the overall load during the entire week as Γ i = 
Experimental Results
To evaluate the performance of our algorithm, we compute the relative net profit increment RP i attained by each NO i, that is defined as:
where A = ⌈168/∆t⌉ is the number of executions of the algorithm, while x i (S (k) ) and P (k) i correspond to the payoff received by NO i at the k-th algorithm execution and the profit it would attain if it worked alone (computed as in Eq. (3)), respectively. Note that, in general, several Nash-stable coalitions may result at each algorithm execution; in these cases, x i (S (k) ) is computed as the average of the payoffs yielded by all the Nash-stable coalitions that may form.
To explain the results, we also compute, for each NO i, two additional quantities, namely:
• ON i , the ratio of the number of times that BS i is switched on after an execution of the algorithm over the total number of algorithm executions;
• XL i , the difference between the ratio of the total number of users served by BS i when working in a coalition over the total number of users it would serve if it was working alone, and 1; this quantity corresponds to the relative deviation of load experienced by BS i with respect to the case it works alone, where a positive (negative) value represents an increment (decrement) of load with respect to the case of working alone.
In the rest of this section, we discuss the impact of the electricity price first (Section 4.2.1), then we consider the effects of the heterogeneity of user requirements (Section 4.2.2), then we evaluate the impact of the discretization step width (Section 4.2.3), and finally we conclude with a discussion of our findings (Section 4.2.4). 
Impact of Energy Costs
The energy cost E i obviously impacts on the net profit achieved by an NO i. Intuitively, if energy is expensive, NO i may find it profitable to offload its users to other NOs, so that it can switch off its BS. Conversely, if energy is inexpensive, it may try to attract users from other NOs.
To quantify the effects of energy price on the net profits achieved by NOs, we carry out experiments on a set of scenarios obtained by setting E i to either E lo = 0.12 $/kWh (which is a typical value of electricity cost in the US [31] ) or E hi = 2 · E lo = 0.24 $/kWh. Because of space constraints, we discuss only the results corresponding to four of the 32 (i.e., 2 5 ) distinct scenarios resulting from the assignment of each cost value to each one of the NOs, as indicated in Table 2 .
These four scenarios have been selected since they can be considered representative of two opposite situations that may occur in practice: the first two scenarios (1 and 2) correspond indeed to standard situations where all BSs, being located in the same urban area, pay the same energy price, while the last two scenarios (3 and 4) correspond to possible near-future scenarios where different BSs can draw energy produced by either fossil fuel or renewable sources [5] and, as such, pay different prices. In these scenarios, all users require the same minimum downlink bandwidth (i.e., D j = 10 Mbps) and generate the same revenue rate R j = 0.07 $/hour (this value is based on the 1 GB/month Share-Everything plan from Verizon Wireless [32] ). Furthermore, we assume that each NO executes an instance of Algorithm 1 at every hour (i.e., ∆t = 1 hour). Table 3 shows the net profit increment RP i for each NO i, while Table 4 shows the corresponding ON i and XL i values.
Let us start with scenarios 1 and 2. As can be seen from the corresponding rows in Table 3 , NO 1 and NO 3 achieve the lowest and the highest net profit increase, respectively, in both scenarios. The corresponding ON i and XL i values provide an explanation of these facts. Indeed, while NO 3 is able to switch off its BS most of the times (ON 3 is no larger than 26%), thus reducing its energy cost, NO 1 keeps it switched on for 90% of the times or more, thus incurring into an high energy cost. This, in turn, is due to the characteristics of the respective load profiles: while NO 1 most of the times has too many clients to be able to offload all of them to other NOs, NO 3 is in the opposite situation. As a consequence, NO 1 is able to accept users coming from other NOs (XL 1 is larger than 60%), but the extra revenues they generate is in large part elided by its energy costs. Finally, the profit increments of the other NOs (namely, 2, 4, and 5) fall in between the above two extremes: they are indeed able to offload their users more often than NO 1 (they have a lower load), but not as often as NO 3 (their load is higher), as indicated by Table 4 . This phenomenon occurs also in scenarios 3 and 4, where we observe that the largest net profit increases are achieved by the NOs that are associated with the highest energy costs (NOs 2 and 3 in scenario 3, and NO 4 and 5 in scenario 4). As indicated by Table 4 , these NOs are indeed often able to offload all their users to other BSs (such a frequency depends on the respective load profiles) so that they can frequently switch off their BSs, and the cost savings they achieve are significant given their higher energy costs. Again, as in scenarios 1 and 2, NO 1 gets the lower profit increase, since its ability to switch its BS off remains lower than the other players.
Impact of User Heterogeneity
In the previous set of experiments, all the users were assumed to request the same minimum downlink data rate. However, in realistic settings, it is reasonable to expect that users with different requirements and revenues co-exist in the same area.
In order to study the impact of the composition of the user population on the ability of our algorithm to yield satisfactory results, we carry out a set of experiments in which, for each one of the scenarios listed in Table 2 , users are partitioned in equal proportions into three classes, each one characterized by a different values of the minimum downlink data rate and revenue rate (as reported in Table 5 ). As in Section 4.2.1, we assume that each NO executes an instance of Algorithm 1 at every hour (i.e., ∆t = 1 hour). Table 6 shows the net profit increment RP i for each NO i. As for the case of homogeneous users, we observe that in scenarios 1 and 2, the lowest and the highest net profit increases 18 are achieved by NO 1 (i.e., the NO with the heaviest loaded BS) and NO 3 (i.e., the NO with the lightest loaded BS), respectively, while, in scenarios 3 and 4, the largest net profit increments are reached by the NOs that are associated with the highest energy costs (i.e., NOs 2 and 3 in scenario 3, and NOs 4 and 5 in scenario 4). The explanation of this fact is the same given for the homogeneous users case, so we do not repeat it here. Furthermore, while the composition of user population has no appreciable effects on the choices taken by individual NOs, it has an evident effect on the net profit increase attained by each NO. As can be indeed seen from Table 6 , the RP values are lower than those achieved by each NO in the same scenario when users are homogeneous (reported in Table 3 ). This is not unexpected, given the lower average revenue rate brought by each user (0.0356 $/hour versus 0.07 $/hour). However, we also note that these increases remain significant.
Impact of ∆t
The final set of results we comment are concerned with the behavior of the algorithm when the discretization step ∆t increases, i.e., when its frequency of activation decreases. This parameter has an evident impact on the solutions computed by the algorithm, since the larger its value, the coarser the approximation of the load value used to compute the optimal coalition load cost Q(·), and the lower the impact of the coalition formation cost K(·).
To quantify this impact, we run several experiments in which we progressively increase ∆t. Because of space constraints, here we discuss only the results obtained for ∆t = 2, 4, 6 hours for the same scenarios and user population considered in Section 4.2.1, that are reported in Figure 5 . The figure shows for each value of ∆t (in the x-axis) the corresponding RP values of the various NOs (denoted as RP (∆t), in the y-axis). Also, for the sake of comparability, in the same figure, we report the RP values obtained for ∆t = 1 hour.
As can be seen from Figure 5 , the larger ∆t, the lower the net profit increase attained by each NO for a given scenario with respect to when ∆t = 1.
As previously pointed out for the case of ∆t = 1, the energy cost plays an important role in the achieved net profit increments. This still holds for larger value of ∆t since, as can be noted in Figure 5 , the decrease of the RP values, for increasing values of ∆t, is as much larger as the higher is the energy cost. For instance, this can be observed by comparing the RP values obtained in scenarios 1 (see Figure 5a ) and 2 (see Figure 5b ), whereby the electricity cost double. Here, we can note that as ∆t increases, the RP values drops by a factor of about 2 in scenario 1, and by a factor of nearly 2.5 but that can reach a factor of about 4.8 for NO 3, in scenario 2. A similar situation happens in scenarios 3 and 4, where the NOs that experience the higher decrease of their RP values are the ones with associated the higher electricity cost, namely NOs 2 and 3 in scenario 3 (see Figure 5c ) and NOs 4 and 5 in scenario 4 (see Figure 5d ).
Discussion
From the results obtained in the experimental evaluation we can conclude that:
• energy costs greatly influence the coalition formation and the net profit increments achieved by NOs;
• NOs with higher energy costs are more motivated to join a coalition since they can offload their users to NOs with lower energy costs, thus allowing to switch off their BSs and hence to achieve a higher net profit increment;
• NOs with heavier load are motivated to join a coalition as well, since they can host users of other NOs, thus amortizing their energy costs;
• the composition of user population has no effect on the choices made by the various NOs, while -if the revenue associated with each user is directly proportional to its minimum downlink data rate -it has a strong impact on the net profit increment;
• the discretization step ∆t has a significant impact on the coalition formation process, as the larger its value, the lower the net profit increment;
• when choosing the discretization step ∆t, one have to also take into account the impact of the energy cost as, the larger is ∆t the higher is the (negative) impact of the energy cost on the achieved net profit increment.
Related Works
The problem of increasing the profit of NOs in cellular wireless networks has been already studied in the literature, where several papers on this topic have been published.
However, to the best of our knowledge, the problem of forming multiple stable coalitions of BSs, in order to reduce energy consumption and to increase the profit of different and selfish NOs, has never been tackled before. In our work, we pursue this problem by proposing a novel approach based on mathematical optimization and on the coalition formation game theory.
Much of current research focuses indeed on energy saving techniques as a way to reduce NO costs [5] . For instance, works like [33, 34, 35, 36] use optimization techniques and traffic profile patterns to determine when and where to switch off BSs, while those like [9] use cell-zooming techniques to adaptively adjust the cell size according to traffic load and to possibly switch off inactive cells. Other works, like [37] , focus on techniques to improve spectrum efficiency in order to enhance the utilization of data subcarriers and thus to better amortize the license costs of frequency bands. These techniques, however, do not consider the cooperation among different NOs, and therefore are unable, unlike our approach, to exploit the advantages brought by such a cooperation. Furthermore, they do not jointly tackle the problems of ensuring QoS to users and of reducing energy consumption.
Approaches attempting to jointly achieve QoS and energy savings have been recently proposed [27, 38, 39, 40] .
In [27] , a static joint planning and management optimization approach to limit energy consumption (by switching BSs on and off according to the traffic load) while guaranteeing QoS and minimizing NO costs is proposed. This approach, however, is inherently static (it operates at network design time) so, unlike ours, is unable to operate in a dynamic environment.
In [38] , the authors present a cooperative game-theoretic approach, in which individual access networks with insufficient resources join to form the grand-coalition in order to satisfy service demands. This proposal is unable to support non trivial scenarios featuring multiple NOs, a time-varying number of connected users, the energy consumption and the costs due to coalition formation and operation, that may prevent the formation of the grand coalition in favor of smaller and more stable coalitions. Conversely, these scenarios are properly dealt with by our work.
In [39] , a game-theoretic approach for the energy-efficient operation of heterogeneous LTE cellular networks, belonging to a single NO, is proposed. This approach, however, does not guarantee the stability of the coalitions that are formed, while stability is a core property of our solution. Furthermore, it is unable to deal with complex scenarios featuring multiple NOs possibly exhibiting different energy prices, and a time-varying population of users. In contrast, our algorithm is able to deal with the above scenarios, and always yield stable coalitions.
In [40] , the authors propose a hierarchical dynamic game framework to increase the capacity of two-tier cellular networks by offloading traffic from macro cells to small cells. This work does not take into account the opportunity to selectively switch off underutilized BSs thus offloading the related users to the remaining switched-on BSs. Therefore, our approach can be considered complementary to this one, as it is able to provide a profitable way to select what macro cells to consider before applying the proposed hierarchical game.
Conclusion and Future Works
This paper presents a novel dynamic cooperation scheme among a group of cellular NOs to achieve profit maximization. We propose a cooperative game-theoretic framework to study the problem of forming stable coalitions among NOs, and a mathematical optimization model to allocate users to a set of BSs, in order to reduce NO costs and, at the same time, to meet user QoS.
Our solution adopts a distributed approach in which the best solution arises without the need to synchronize the various NOs or to resort to a trusted third party, and such that no NO can benefit by moving from its coalition to another (possibly empty) one.
In the proposed scheme, we model the cooperation among the NOs as a coalition game with transferable utility and we devise a hedonic shift algorithm to form stable coalitions. With our algorithm, each NO autonomously and selfishly decides whether to leave the current coalition to join a different one according to his preference, meanwhile improving its perceived net profit. We prove that the proposed algorithm converges to a Nash-stable partition which determines the resulting coalition structure. Our algorithm can be readily implemented in a distributed fashion, given that each NO can act independently and asynchronously from any other NO in the system. Furthermore, the asynchronicity of our algorithm makes it able to adapt to environmental changes (like new user arrivals).
To prove the effectiveness of our approach, we perform a thorough numerical evaluation by means of trace-based simulation, using realistic scenarios and real-world traffic data. To evaluate the performance of our algorithms, we vary, in a controlled way, the values of its input parameters, like the energy cost and the user heterogeneity.
The future developments of this research is following several directions. Firstly, we want to extend our work to include cellular networks sparsely deployed in wider geographical areas. To do so, we will have to take into account several issues, like the network coverage problem, whereby a BS can be switched off only if a group of neighboring BSs can cover the area it serves.
As as second research direction, we want to explore different variants of our algorithm, especially suited for large cellular networks. Specifically, when the number of BSs increases, the time to convergence of our algorithm may be too long for practical uses, especially for small values of the discretization step. In these cases, it would be better to renounce to the quality of the obtained solution in favor of a more readily available solution. Our current algorithm always provides the best solution (i.e., a Nash-stable partition), but at the cost of visiting, in the worst case, all possible coalitions. To this end, we want to design an anytime version of our algorithm (i.e., an algorithm which can return a -possibly suboptimalsolution any time) and we want to compare its performance with the current one.
Finally, we would like to extend our work to include the cooperation between BSs and their users, in order to improve the energy reduction of BSs and the quality of experience of connected users.
